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Social Suffering and Public Value 
A Spur to New Projects of Social Inquiry and Social Care  
Iain Wilkinson 
 





One of the distinguishing features of social science in the twenty-first century lies in a new-
found FRQFHUQZLWKSUREOHPVRIµVRFLDOVXIIHULQJ¶2YHU WKHSDVW WKLUW\\HDUVRUVR WKLVKDV
featured as a headline interest in some important works of critical sociology and anthropology 
(Bourdieu et al 1999; Kleinman et al 1997; Das et al 2001; Renault 2008). With reference to 
µVRFLDO VXIIHULQJ¶ UHVHDUFKHUV GHFODUH a commitment to understand how human suffering is 
caused by society, but with a focus brought to how this is encountered and manifested in 
SHRSOH¶s experiences of day-to-day life. Forms of social organization and uneven distributions 
of socio-economic resources are made subject to critical debate with attention placed on lived 
experiences of pain and misery. More directly, this involves researchers documenting the ways 
individuals give voice to their distress and how suffering is manifested in their physical and 
mental health conditions. The incidence of social suffering is understood to expose how society 
RSHUDWHV WR GDPDJH SHRSOH¶V KXPDQ GLJQLW\ DQG SHUVRQKRRG. Here social life is taken as a 
distinctly moral experience that greatly matters for people (Kleinman 1998; 2006). Readers are 
invited to feel for the plight of individuals caught up in situations of adversity. A deliberate 
attempt is made to stir up emotions of sympathy and compassion on the understanding that 
these hold the potential to operate as a means to forge bonds of social solidarity and a political 
concern for social justice (Farmer 2006). In this regard, research and writing on social suffering 
is directly concerned with advancing the public value of social science (Brewer 2013). Here 
the conduct of social research is LQIRUPHG E\ DQ HDUOLHU µFODVVLFDO¶ example of critical 
pragmatism championed by figures such as Jane Addams, W.E.B du Bois and Albion Small 
(Addams 1998 [1910]; Becker 1971; Deegan 1988; Morris 2015). It is directed by the 
understanding that social science should be committed to projects of ameliorative social 
reform. The pedagogy of caregiving is deemed a necessary part of the processes through which 
we might apprehend the meaning and value of human life in social terms (Wilkinson and 
Kleinman 2016).  
 
Arguably this approach is connected to a wider movement within contemporary social science 
that seeks to better understand the roles played by human emotions in the conduct of social life 
(Forgas 2001; Lvon and Barbalet 2004; Williams 2001). Research and writing on social 
suffering can be portrayed as part of an µDIIHFWLYHWXUQ¶where scholars attend to how human 
thoughts and behaviors are directed by moral feelings, and further take note of how these are 
set to shape our politics (Ahmed 2014). Here a connection might also be drawn to critical 
movements operating within medical sociology that aim to expose the damage done to people 
WKURXJKWKHµPHGLFDOL]DWLRQ¶RIKHDOWKIt is notably the case that social suffering features as a 
concern among those intent on questioning the values governing the conduct of modern 
rationality as applied to health care and the practice of medicine, and more often than not this 
is accompanied by a protest against the ways these are set opposed to humanitarian principle 





The attention that is brought to problems of social suffering can also be related to the fact that 
over the last fifty years or so, new communication media, and especially through the forms of 
cultural experience made possible by television and the internet, have transformed the ways we 
relate to our moral situation and the needs of others (Wilkinson 2005; 2013). The daily routine 
of watching television news or trawling viral video sites brings us into contact with dramatic 
scenes of war, famine, atrocity and abuse that were unknown to previous generations 
(Thompson 1995: 226-7). Insofar as it is now commonplace for us to gaze upon human 
suffering at a safe distance far removed from actual contexts of violence and harm, it is argued 
that we need to re-think our ethical situation and reappraise the bounds of moral responsibility 
(Boltanski 1999; Chouliaraki 2006; 2013; Cohen 2001). It is argued that the dramatic scale of 
the world problems now made visible for us, and especially through graphic depictions of 
human suffering, is operating to transform social subjectivity in ways we scarcely recognize or 
understand (Biehl, Good and Kleinman 2007). Some of those involved with problems of social 
suffering share in an attempt to make better sense of our existential condition in a cultural 
context where it is commonplace for human misery to be commercialized as news 
µLQIRWDLQPHQW¶ (Kleinman 1995; Kleinman and Kleinman 1997). On this view, by documenting 
expressions of moral feeling that take place in response to the suffering of others, and by 
attending to how these appear to influence the dynamics of social action, we are seeking to 
understand distinctly new possibilities for human consciousness and behaviour (Rifkin 2009).  
 
At another level of understanding, however, the twenty first century interest in social suffering 
marks a return to traditions of social inquiry that place a high value on the cultivation of our 
potential for µIHOORZIHHOLQJ¶0XOODQµ6RFLDOVXIIHULQJ¶LVDFRQFHSt that originates in 
the eighteenth century enlightenment of sympathy (Frazer 2010; Wilkinson and Kleinman 
2016: 25-9). It belongs to an earlier cultural and political movement that welcomed the 
eighteenth century flowering of humanitarian sensibility as a means to further the bounds of 
social recognition and social understanding. In this context µWKHVRFLDOTXHVWLRQ¶ was first posed 
along with the understanding that it involved us in a political debate over how to respond to 
the moral feelings we experience when we are made to observe the suffering of others 
(Himmelfarb 1991).  It was commonly the case, moreover, that those such as William 
Wordsworth, who was among the first draw a focus to µsocial suffering¶DVVXFK were of the 
opinion that compassion had a vital role to play in making it possible for us to grasp how 
conditions of social life directly matter for people (Wilkinson and Kleinman 2016: 25-29). 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century this was an issue of great controversy. Among educated 
elites, humanitarian sentiment tended to be portrayed as an irrational force that, if left 
unchecked, was set to become a moral corruption. Social sympathy was variously cast as a 
feminine weakness, an encouragement to indiscriminate charity and as a lust for sensationalism 
that led people to indulge in acts of promiscuous voyeurism (Barker-Benfield 1992; Halttunen 
1995; Reddy 2000). As Hannah Arendt reminds us, thHUH ZHUH DOVR RFFDVLRQV ZKHUH µWKH
SDVVLRQ RI FRPSDVVLRQ¶ was understood to operate as an encouragement to revolutionary 
insurrection, for it was widely assumed that a morally outraged and sentiment fired response 
to human suffering could be used to justify violence as the means to make right the world 
(Arendt 1963: 59-114). For these reasons, moreover, among most early practitioners of social 
science, and especially those concerned with the status of sociology and anthropology as 
µVFLHQFH¶WKHµUHEHOOLRQRIVHQWLPHQW¶ tended to be cast as an anathema to sound reason and 
principled judgement (Bannister 1991; Haskell 2000; Lepennies 1988; Poovey 1994; 1998; 





In this chapter I offer a brief review of contemporary research and writing on social suffering. 
This is designed as an invitation to further dialogue and debate. The first section offers a more 
detailed overview of the range of interests and concerns that characterize the ways in which 
problems of social suffering are addressed in current sociology and anthropology. The second 
section further outlines how these developments are set to court moral and political 
controversy. I conclude by arguing that the renewed gathering of interest around problems of 
social suffering is set to make the public value of social science a pressing matter for debate. 
More directly, this draws a focus to many longstanding tensions and hostilities in the 
relationship between social science and modern humanitarianism. I suggest that here we are 
challenged to reformulate and revise the ways we assess the role of moral sentiment in the 
production of social understanding. I also hold that the conduct of social research is drawn into 
debate in terms of how it operates a moral practice, and at this point it stands to be judged not 
so much in terms of the production of critique, but rather in its contribution to the practice of 
human care. 
 
The Field of Social Suffering 
 
7KHFRQFHSWRIµVRFLDOVXIIHULQJ¶LVXVHGWRUHIHUXVWRWKHOLYHGH[SHULHQFHRISDLQGDPDJH
injury, deprivation and loss. Here it is generally understood that human afflictions are 
encountered in multiple forms and that their deleterious effects are manifold, but a particular 
emphasis is brought to bear upon the extent to which particular social conditions and distinct 
forms of culture both constitute and moderate the ways in which suffering is experienced and 
H[SUHVVHG:LWK UHIHUHQFH WR µVRFLDO VXIIHULQJ¶ UHVHDUFKHUV DWWHQG WR WKH ZD\V LQ ZKLFK WKH
subjective components of distress are rooted in social situations and conditioned by cultural 
circumstance. It is held that social worlds are inscribed upon the embodied experience of pain 
DQG WKDW WKHUH DUH PDQ\ RFFDVLRQV ZKHUH DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V VXIIHULQJ VKRXOG EH WDNHQ DV D
manifestation of wider processes of social structural oppression and/or collective experiences 
of cultural trauma (Wilkinson 2005; Kleinman et al 1997; Kleinman and Wilkinson 2016). 
 
,Q WKH VRFLRORJ\ RI KHDOWK VRFLDO PHGLFLQH DQG PHGLFDO DQWKURSRORJ\ µVRFLDO VXIIHULQJ¶ LV
associated with efforts to broaden the biomedical conceptualization of pain so that recognition 
LVEURXJKWWRWKHZD\VLQZKLFKERWKWKHH[SHULHQFHRISDLQDQGDSHUVRQ¶VUHVSRQVLYHQHVVWR
LWV µWUHDWPHQW¶ DUH PRGHUDWHG E\ FXOWXUDO FRQGLWLRQV DQG VRFLDO FRQWH[WV %HQGHORZ 6; 
Delvecchio Good et al. 1992). And here it also features as part of a critical engagement with 
conventions of health care practice that aims to make these more attuned to the lived experience 
RI LOOQHVV DQG WKH LQYROYHPHQW RI SHRSOH¶V VRFLDO ELRJUDSKLHV ZLWKLQ WKH JHQHUDWLRQ RI
debilitating forms of mental anguish and distress.  With a focus brought to problems of social 
VXIIHULQJDSHUVRQ¶VKHDOWKFRQGLWLRQLVFDVWDVDFXPXODWLYHSURGXFWRIVRFLDOSURFHVVHVDQG
FULWLFDOOLIHHYHQWV,WLVDUJXHGWKDWLQWKHTXDOLW\RIDSHUVRQ¶VSK\VLFDODQGPHQWDOKHDOWKZH
are presented with a moral barometer of their social experience (Kleinman 1988; 1999; 2006).  
 
,QWKHFRQWH[WVRI)UHQFKVRFLRORJ\DQGSV\FKRORJ\UHVHDUFKDQGZULWLQJRQµVRFLDOVXIIHULQJ¶
has been taken up as a means to bring public attention to the cumulative miseries of ordinary 
life, and here such work tends to be overtly political in its intentions and design (Renault 2008).  
It operates as part of a movement to expose the negative social effects of neo-liberal economic 
policies. It works to expose the harms that are done to people trapped living in poor housing 
conditions in areas mired in social deprivation.  It documents the many humiliations and 
agonizing frustrations borne by the unemployed as well as those struggling to survive on the 
low wages they receive for the exhausting hours spent performing menial work tasks (Dejours 




makers are often LQFOLQHGWRµH[SODLQDZD\¶VXFKVXIIHULQJDVDQXQIRUWXQDWHDQGXQDYRLGDEOH
µVLGH-HIIHFW¶RIVRFLDOOLIHLQFDSLWDOLVWVRFLHWLHVE\FRQWUDVWZHVKRXOGUHJDUGWKLVDVPRUDOO\
DQGSROLWLFDOO\XQDFFHSWDEOHDQGDVDSUHVVLQJPDWWHUIRUFULWLFDOFRQFHUQ$FFRUGLQJO\µVRFLDO
VXIIHULQJ¶ LV DGGUHVVHG DV D SUREOHP WKDW LVVXHV D KXPDQLWDULDQ Fhallenge to the moral 
conventions of our political culture, and further, aims to provoke us into a critical questioning 
RIWKHFXOWXUDODQGSROLWLFDOSURFHVVHVZKHUHE\µZH¶DUHDFFOLPDWLVHGWRUHJDUGWKHVXIIHULQJRI




the centre of the attempt to draw public attention to the experience of people living in 
developing societies, and in this respect, many of those concerned with problems of social 
suffering are also engaged in an attempt to re-align the polarities of global social understanding.  
The documentation of experiences of people suffering from diseases of poverty is taken up as 
a means to engage in global public debate over the structural conditions that systematically 
reproduce the material and social deprivation of the so-FDOOHGµ7KLUG:RUOG¶ )DUPHU 1997; 
1999; 2005; 2013). Indeed, the advocacy of human rights and humanitarian social reform is 
PDGH H[SOLFLW LQ PDQ\ LQVWDQFHV ZKHUH µVRFLDO VXIIHULQJ¶ LV GHSOR\HG DV D GHVFULSWLYH WRRO
and/or analytical device for conveying the human consequences of the physical violence, 
emotional distress and social deprivation experienced in contexts of war, civil conflict and 
totalitarian abuse (Das 1995; 2007; Scheper-Hughes 1992; 1997; 1998). 
 
,WLVSRVVLEOHWRFKDUDFWHULVHDJUHDWGHDORIUHVHDUFKDQGZULWLQJRQµVRFLDOVXIIHULQJ¶DVDFULWLFDO
praxis that seeks to establish the right of people to have rights (Arendt 1973). Some label what 
WDNHVSODFHKHUHDVDµSROLWLFVRIUHFRJQLWLRQ¶$[HO+RQQHWKDUJXHVWKDWLWLVRIWHQWKHFDVHWKDW




and aims to use ethnographic texts and photography as a means to shock his readers into 
questioning the human values and responsibilities that bind them to the victims of suffering 
)DUPHU+HXVHVZKDWHYHU µUKHWRULFDO WRROV¶DUHDYDLODEOH WRKLP WRFRQYH\ WKH
H[SHULHQFH RI LQGLYLGXDOV G\LQJ IURP $,'6 DQG VHHNV WR RIIHQG UHDGHUV¶ VHQVLELOLWLHV ZLWK
images of the physical torment suffered by people living in circumstances of extreme material 
deprivation.  Farmer uses such methods to advocate an expanded notion of human rights that 
JLYHVDVPXFKLPSRUWDQFHWRWKHULJKWWRµIUHHGRPIURPZDQW¶DVWRFLYLODQGSROLWLFDOULJKWV 
  
Similarly, Veena Das H[SODLQVKHUZRUNDVDQDWWHPSWWRGHYLVHµODQJXDJHVRISDLQ¶E\ZKLFK
social sciences might be crafted as a textual body on whLFKµSDLQLVZULWWHQ¶'DV: 67). 
Her ethnographic practice is designed to fashion a re-HQWU\ WR µVFHQHV RI GHYDVWDWLRQ¶ DQG 
ZRUOGVµPDGHVWUDQJHWKRXJKWKHGHVRODWLQJH[SHULHQFHRIYLROHQFHDQGORVVLELG+HUHWKH
efforts made to convey the standpoint of women who have been subjected to brutal acts of 
YLROHQFHLQWKHLQWHUQHFLQHFRQIOLFWVRI,QGLD¶VFLYLOZDUVDUHLQWHQGHG DVDPHDQVWRµFRQYHUW¶
such experience into a script that can be used to establish ties of empathy and communal self-
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ'DVSUHVHQWVWKLVDVSDUWRIDµZRUNRIKHDOLQJ¶WKDWFUHDWHVDVRFLDOVSDFHIRU
the recognition of human rights and possibilities for a retrieval of human dignity (Das 1994; 
1995; 2007; Das et al. 2001). 
 
Whilst engaging with such struggles for recognition, writers such as Farmer and Das tend to 




suffering is intended not only as a plea for recognition but also as a means to initiate a wider 
set of inquiries into the institutional foundations of civil society and the grounds upon which it 
PD\EHSRVVLEOHWRUHDOLVHSHRSOH¶VVRFLDl and economic rights. For example, Farmer writes: 
 
³>5@HFRJQLWLRQLVQRWHQRXJK«:HQHHGDQRWKHUPRGHUQPRYHPHQWDJOREDOL]HGPRYHPHQW
that will use whatever stories and images it can to promote respect for human rights, especially 
the rights of the poor. For such a movement to come about, we need to rehabilitate a series of 
sentiments long out of fashion in academic and policy circles: indignation on behalf not of 
oneself but of the less fortunate; solidarity; empathy; and even pity, compassion, mercy,  and 
UHPRUVH««6WRULHVDQGLPDJHVQHHGWREHOLQNHGWRWKHKLVWRULFDOO\GHHSHUDQGJHRJUDSKLFDOO\
wider analyses that can allow the listener or the observer to understand the ways in which 
AIDS, a new disease, is rooted in the historically defined conditions that promote its spread 
and deny its treatment; the ways in which genocide, like slavery before it, is a fundamentally 
µWUDQVQDWLRQDO¶HYHQW WKHUHDVRQVZK\EUHDVWFDQFHULV LQHYLWDEO\IDWDOIRU WKHPRVWDIIHFWHG
women in who live in poverty; the meaning of rights in an interconnected world riven by 
poverty and inequality. In short, serious social ills require in-GHSWKDQDO\VHV´ 
                            (Farmer 2006: 185)  
 
In many instances, documents of social suffering are committed to humanitarian projects of 
social reform. Humanitarian care for people is identified with care for human society as such, 
and further, by our participation in acts of caregiving, it is argued that it is made possible to 
work at understanding how human social life is made possible, and in particular the forms of 
social life which make possible pro-social human relationships (Wilkinson and Kleinman 
2016: 161-87). This is tKHDSSURDFKWKDWVXVWDLQHG-DQH$GGDPV¶DSSURDFKWRµGRLQJVRFLRORJ\¶
in the context of the activities of the progressive era Chicago settlement community of Hull-
House (Addams 1965 [1892]; 1998 [1910]; 2002 [1902]). Addams not only set caregiving as 
the practical aim of her sociology, but further, she understood acts of care to hold the potential 
to expose how social life takes place in enactments of substantive human values. The 
experience of caregiving was taken as the grounds for critical thinking about human social 
conditions and the potential for sociology to be applied to their amelioration. These 
commitments and terms of understanding are once again being advanced as a prime concern in 
the humanitarian medical anthropology of Philip Bourgois, Paul Farmer, Arthur Kleinman and 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes (Bourgois 2002; Bourgois and Schonberg 2009; Farmer 1992; 1999; 
2006; 2013; Kleinman 1980; 2006; Scheper-Hughes 1992; 1998; 2005; 2011). In this context, 
research and writing on social suffering represents a call for social scientists to move beyond 
the politics of recognition so as to directly involve themselves in actions to deliver 
humanitarian social change. The work of critique is merely taken as a means to clear a space 







As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the earliest referHQFHV WR µVRFLDOVXIIHULQJ¶ZHUH
connected to initiatives to promote humanitarian social concern and these attracted a great deal 
of public controversy, intellectual dispute and political contest. This was partly linked to the 
political fallout from a radical break in received traditions of moral understanding whereby 
accounts of human affliction in terms of religious theodicy were being replaced with 




Morgan and Wilkinson 2001). Where for most of human history, the experience of suffering 
had been invested with religious meaning, here for the first time it was addressed in largely 
secular terms as a matter that sounded a distinctly social alarm, and which further pointed to 
the fact that something was seriously wrong with the conditions of society in which people 
were made to live. Many of the early controversies attached WR µVRFLDO VXIIHULQJ¶ZHUHalso 
FRQQHFWHG WR GLVSXWHV VXUURXQGLQJ WKH PRUDO VWDWXV RI µWKH VRFLDO¶ DV D Fategory of human 
understanding, and further, to how this should be formulated as a matter of study and debate. 
 
For many, these became most heated in contexts where it was claimed that critical thought 
about social life and movements to secure progressive social change should be open to the 
influence of moral feeling. Where on the one hand, some, and especially those identified as 
µKXPDQLWDULDQ¶took the view that the moral feelings aroused in face of the brute facts of human 
suffering were a vital and necessary part of the cultivation of social consciousness and 
conscience, others, and especially those set RQDPLVVLRQWRµVFLHQWL]H¶WKHVWXG\RIVRFLHW\KHOG
that these should play no part in rational processes investigation and debate (Wilkinson and 
Kleinman 2016: 148). Critics of social sensibility were worried by the possibility that moral 
sentiment was open to corruption to a point where it became more a vice than a virtue 
(Halttunen 1995).  They also worried over the extent to which it could be appropriated in the 
service of projects of ideological manipulation (Ellis 1996: 190-221). Humanitarian moral 
IHHOLQJVDQGHVSHFLDOO\WKRVHFRQQHFWHGWRWKHµWKHVRFLDOTXHVWLRQ¶were portrayed as wild 
and unruly, and as opposed to reason and principled debate (Arendt 1963). By contrast, those 
prepared to take social sympathy as a guide to critical thought and action tended to see a greater 
danger lying in the propensity for cultures of rationalization to operate, as Max Weber famously 
SXW LW µZLWKRXW UHJDUG IRU SHUVRQV¶ (Weber 1948: 215). In this FRQWH[W WKH µUHEHOOLRQ RI
VHQWLPHQW¶ WHQGHG WR EH GLUHFWHG WRZDUGV laissez-faire economics and utilitarian forms of 
thinking in social policy that, by advancing the rule of calculation above all other 
considerations, operated to draw a dispassionate veil over many desperate human situations 
and personal miseries (Roberts 2002: 258-331). 
 
It might be argued that in more recent debates FRQQHFWHG WRSUREOHPVRI µVRFLDO VXIIHULQJ¶
sociologists and anthropologists are revisiting these earlier controversies and are occupying 
similar value positions. For example, critics such as Craig Calhoun and Lilie Chouliaraki are 
overwhelmingly preoccupied with exposing the ways in which µWKHKXPDQLWDULDQLPSHUDWLYHWR
UHGXFHVXIIHULQJ¶DQGµWKHKXPDQLWDULDQLPDJLQDU\¶DUHXVHGWRFRQVWUDLn critical thought and 
to promote self-serving strains of sentimentality (Calhoun 2004; 2008; Chouliaraki 2013). 
Similarly, and with more direct concern with the involvement of research and writing on social 
VXIIHULQJLQFRQWHPSRUDU\KXPDQLWDULDQSROLWLFV'LGLHU)DVVLQSRUWUD\VµKXPDQLWDULDQUHDVRQ¶ 
as a delusional ideology that more often than not operates to institute relations of domination 
across society. He further argues that here social scientists tend to be fooled into thinking that 
simply by listening to the misfortunes of others that they are engaged in some form of 
emancipatory social practice (Fassin 2012). Although very much concerned with the culture 
and politics of their times, in these instances once again an overwhelming emphasis is placed 
on the potential for humanitarian culture and moral sentiment to operate to occlude clear 
sighted critical rationality, and often this is coupled with further worries relating to its potential 
to promote ideologies of discriminatory social control above any serious attempt to address the 
real causes and scale of human suffering. 
 
Taking an opposing view, those associated with research and writing on social suffering prefer 





Bourdieu argues that we should be more worried by the moral position occupied by critical 
VRFLDOVFLHQWLVWVZKHQWKH\RSHUDWHIURPDQµREMHFWLYLVLQJGLVWDQFHWKDWUHGXFHVWKHLQGLYLGXDO
WRDVSHFLPHQLQDGLVSOD\FDVH¶%RXUGLHXa: 2).  He urges us to attend to thHµV\PEROLF
YLROHQFH¶SHUSHWUDWHGE\UDWLRQDOLVLQJFRQYHQWLRQVRIDFDGHPLFZULWLQJWKDWZRUNWRFOHDUDQG
cut a way through the many hermeneutic confusions and epistemological frustrations borne by 
people under common sense conditions of everyday life. As he puts it, the greater danger here 
is that in our social science µZHGRQRWKLQJEXWJORVVRQHDQRWKHU¶ (Bourdieu 1999b: 607).  
 
By no means is this to deny that there are many risks inherent in forms of writing that seek to 
cultivate a sympathetic approach to social understanding, rather the key point here is that every 
V\PEROLF SRUWUD\DO RI VRFLDO OLIH ULVNV EHLQJ XVHG LQ KDUPIXO ZD\V WKDW GLPLQLVK SHRSOH¶V
humanity. Practitioners of social science cannot operate above the fray of morality and politics. 
In all their research, and all the more so because it directly concerns what matters for people, 
they are engaged in enactments of human value. Accordingly, those with a commitment to 
H[SRVHFRQGLWLRQVRIVRFLDOVXIIHULQJGRQRWVK\DZD\IURPFRXUWLQJµXQVWDEOHHPRWLRQV¶ or 
from having their work associated with the many controversies are readily attached to modern 
humanitarianism, for these are taken to be a condition of human social life as such (Farmer 
2006). It is suggested if we are serious in our efforts to understand how social life matters for 
people we must be prepared to broker with the difficulty of making adequate sense of human 
suffering, and further that this requires us to deal with many painful and morally provocative 
feelings.  
 
Moreover, it is suggested that this must involve more than critique, for there is a danger here 
that, within social science at least, critique has a potential to operate as an evasion of social 
OLIH:KLOHRFFXS\LQJWKHFULWLFDOµKLJKJURXQG¶LWLVDUJXHGWKDWVRFLDO scientists often fail to 
critically question the values enacted through their own practices within the academy and 
research field. In this regard, the pedagogy of care that is advocated in some accounts of social 
suffering is taken not only as part of a mRUDOFRPPLWPHQWWRSHRSOH¶VZHOOEHLQJEXWDOVRDVDQ
essential part of the attempt to understand how social life is made humanly possible and 
humane. Here research and writing on social suffering is informed by classical traditions of 
critical pragmatism where researchers hold themselves up to be judged in terms of the practical 




With a focus brought to problems of social suffering researchers tend to operate with the 
understanding that they are involved in reconfiguring the value orientations of social science 
and its practice.  We are called to attend to the ways in which individuals and societies 
experience suffering as well as the historical and cultural conditions under which this is 
ascribed with moral meaning. The problem of human suffering is identified as a decisive 
element within the formation of individual personalities and within the overall character of 
societies. The social practices by which individuals struggle to endure this experience, along 
the institutional arrangements that are set in place under the effort to minimise its deleterious 
effects on human life, are held to exert a major influence over the formation of political cultures 
and the dynamics of social change.  Here there is also an overt concern to expose the 
connections between modern humanitarianism and our capacity to relate to one another as 
social beings in need of social care. Social science is conducted with the understanding that 
caregiving makes a vital contribution to the development of social understanding, and that our 





Writing at the turn of the twentieth century some of early pioneers of sociology such as Lester 
Frank Ward, Albion Small and Jane Adams promoted the view that sociology should be allied 
with humanitarianism. While many of the social scientists of their day stood opposed to do-
gooder confusion and openly disparaged its sentimentalism, these three held out the hope that 
sociology might still operate as the handmaid to humanitarian social reform. On this view, it 
was still possible for rational social science to collaborate with sentiment-fired social inquiry, 
and it was still possible for critical reason to be informed by humanitarian feeling.   However, 
with the advance of academic sociology and the cementing of the links between scientific 
accreditation and the pursuit of career, such vision was lost (Becker 1971; Mazlish 1989). 
Largely speaking, at its origins social science within the academy was set antagonistically 
opposed to humanitarianism.  
 
Research and writing on social suffering courts dispute. This not only relates to the struggle to 
diagnose the causes of human suffering and to identify what can be done to help people in 
situations of adversity. It also draws traditions of social inquiry into debate on account of their 
moral value and human purpose. In the historical record of human suffering, we repeatedly 
come across the extreme paradox that through experiences that entail the most terrible 
uprooting of life, people are brought under the compulsion to reach out for what really matters 
in their lives. This appears to be engrained in the character of the work that takes place here, 
and social science is also made to account for itself on these terms.  Social science is continually 
set to confront its limits, but also with a commitment to making these more suited to what social 
life matters for people. The hope here is that there are still better ways to relate to our modern 
human condition, and that it is yet possible for us to realise more humane forms of society. 
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